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I.—THE GREEK VERBAL IN -TEO.

PART I.

The etymology of the ending *-teo* is disputed. It is usually explained as standing for *tefjos*, akin to the Sanskrit ending *-tavja*; so, e. g., Donaldson, *The New Cratylus*³, p. 641, et al. Brugmann maintains that it stands for *-tefo*, Skt. *-tavya* (*Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik*, II, I, p. 424). To these theories two objections are being urged: 1st, the ending *-tavya* is very rare in the oldest Sanskrit: it is foreign to the language of the Rig-Veda, and in the Atharva-Veda only two instances of its use can be found (Whitney, *Skt. Gr.*, §§962 ff.; Delbrück, *Altindische Syntax*, §§221 ff.). 2d, the ending *-teo* is as foreign to the oldest Greek: we do not meet it as a Gerund at all in Homer, nor can we prove that its use becomes even tolerably common for several centuries after Homer's time. It is quite probable, therefore, that the ending is a "Weiterbildung" of *-tos* (Curtius) or *-tus*, Lat. *-tum* (Westphal, *Grammatik*², I, p. 297). But the Skt. ending *-tavya* is itself composed of the infinitive ending *-tu*, + *yā*. The absence of either of these endings in the oldest monuments of their respective languages inclines us to the assumption that they are not sprung from a common Indo-European original, and inclines us the more to credit the words of the Scholiast to Dionysios Thrax (*Anecdot. Bekk.* II, p. 950): *γίνονται δὲ ταῦτα ἀπὸ τῶν εἰς τος ῥηματικῶν ὀνομάτων, προσθέσει τοῦ ε ποιητικῶς, οἷον ποιητός ποιητέος, πλευστός πλευστέος*. But Curtius goes too far, when stating that the *-teo*-formations differed at first only

slightly (in meaning?) from those in *-τος*. What statistics the present condition of the literature affords us are dead against that position, as is also the inner nature of the *-τεο*-verbal, which postulates a demonstrable verb-stem from which to be derived, and is itself a mood-participle to that verb. While, then, I have counted 283 *-τος*-formations in Homer, the *-τεο*-formations are unknown to the Homeric thesaurus, since neither *ἐτέος* (Classen to the contrary notwithstanding, *Beobachtungen über den Hom. Sprachgebrauch*, p. 197) nor *νηγάτεος* is a verbal in *-τέος*. A final argument against the identity of the Gk. and Skt. endings is the accent. While in Skt. the accent could be either *tanvā* or *tānva*, the accent in Gk. is suspiciously immobile, and adds somewhat to the support of Curtius' theory that from *-τος* came *-τέjos*, *-τεfos*, *-τειος* (actually occurring in Hesiod, Theog. 310, *φατειός*; Scut. Herc. 144 and 161), finally *τέος*. But the final form of the verbal does not as yet appear in Hesiod, for Gross (I, p. 10)¹ was too hasty in announcing *φυκτέος* as a verbal, in Hesiod, fg. 93 of the Catalogus (p. 117, epicorum Graecorum fragmenta, ed. Kinkel, vol. I). The words of the Scholiast to Pind. Ol. X (XI) 46 are: *τὴν πόλιν δὲ καλεῖσθαι φασὶ φύκτεον* (v. l. *φυκτέαν*) *ἀπὸ τίνος Φυκτέως, οὗ μέμνηται καὶ Ἡσίοδος οὕτω*, then follows the quotation, of which the part *φυκτέος ἀγλαὸς νίος* contains Boeckh's conjecture for *φυκτέως*. Besides all this, the verbal *φυκτέος* does not occur in the period to which our investigations are restricted—from Homer to Aristotle exclusive.

From what part of the verb-organism is the verbal derived, if 'derived' at all? Curiously enough, it seems that the Greeks themselves generally reckoned these verbalia among the passive forms of the verb, although the demonstrably passive forms—the personally-used gerundives—are decidedly in the numerical

¹ The following are among the more noteworthy contributions to the literature on the subject of the verbal adjective in *-τέος*:—*Moissisistzig*, Quaestiones de adiectivis Graecis, quae dicuntur, verbalibus. Four particulae: I Conitz 1844, II Conitz 1853, III Conitz 1861; the fourth I have striven in vain to procure. I is a general introduction, II is on Plato's use, III (the least satisfactory) is on Demosthenes' usage. *Gross*, de adiectivis verbalibus in *τος* et *τεος* exeuntibus; 3 programs; Marienwerder, 1839, 1847 and 1854. *Köpetsch*, de verbalibus in *τος* et *τέος* Platonice dissertatio, cui intextae sunt breves de Homericis adnotationes, 1860; a Lyck-program: quite good. *Schulze*, Quaestiuiculae grammaticae ad oratores Atticos spectantes; a Bautzen-program of 1889: very useful. *Karlowa*, Bemerkungen zum Sprachgebrauch des Demosthenes, mit Berücksichtigung anderer attischer Redner; a Pleiss-program, 1883.

minority. If the -τεο-formations are a later growth from the -τος-adjectives, we should expect their relations to the corresponding verb-stem to be identical; nor are we disappointed.

My statistics are as follows:

From Homer to Aristotle, exclusive, there are about 286 separate verbs which furnish us with -τεο-formations. Of that number 159 show precisely the same stem-form, letter for letter, in the verbal as in the stem of the I. aor. pass.

In stating this number, however, we differ with Gross, I, who refers some of those verbalia to the pf. pass. or II. aor. or future; e. g. it is better to refer *εύρετέον* to the I. aor. pass. rather than to the II. aor. act. or mid., which leaves an *ε* unexplained. Similarly it is better to refer *θηρατέον* to the stem of a I. aor. pass. which does exist, than to a pf. pass. which does not. *κρουστέον* is better not referred to the stem as seen in the pf., since those pf. forms without the *σ* are pretty generally preferred to those with *σ* (cf. Blass-Kühner, Gr. Gr., p. 467, etc.).

But we are to add to the above 159 cases 38 others, in which the stem of the verb in I. aor. pass. differs from that of the verbal only by the insignificant difference of the aspiration of the final stem-consonant before the *θ* of the aor. ending: *πεμπτέον*, *ἐπέμφθην*, etc.; thus we count $159 + 38 = 197$ cases of practical identity between verbal stem and stem of verb in I. aor. pass. Omitting cases like *βιωτέον* (cf. Blass-Kühner, p. 384), *διασκηνητέον* (cf. A. J. P. XIII, pp. 12-13), *κοινωνητέον*, etc., in which the I. aor. pass. itself is not producible, but can easily be restored from the fut. pass. of said verb, we next note the five verbalia which are to be referred to the future stem of the verb: *έκτέα*, *συνεστέον*, *θρεκτέον*, *οιστέα*, *πενυστέον* (? cf. Blass-Kühner, §231, 3). We conveniently classify the following 14 verbalia as more or less "irregular." *έχθαρτέος* we prefer identifying with the stem of the presupposed form **εχθαρος*, whence Curtius (*Verbum*², I, p. 372) evolves *έχθρός*: I find no warrant for Gross's (I, p. 4) pf. pass. from which he derives it. *ελκτέον* is one of the two verbalia which are derived from *ελκω*: the one is derived directly from the I. aor. pass. *είλκύσθην*, *έλκυστέος*; the other, *έλκτέον*, is preferably referred to the present stem, as a secondary form, *έλκύσω*, appears in the future. Blass-Kühner asserts that the vowel of *θύω* is either long or short in the present, long in fut. or aor., short in pf. (or aor. passive). Then the length of the stem-vowel is our only guide in referring *θυτέον* to its verb-stem. Unfortunately, the only passage in poetry

in which I have found it—Ar., Av. 1237—does not of itself *prove* whether its measuring is *θῦτέον* or *θύτέον*. Until further instances of its use are found in the poets, we must question the correctness of L. and Scott's *θύτέον*. *θετέον* may be referred to II. aor. act. or middle (so Gross). "De *ιτητέον*," says Lobeck, *Pathologiae sermonis graeci prolegomena*, p. 146, "incertus sum utrum ab obsoleto *ιτέω* declinatum sit, cui simillima sunt *βατέω*, *βοτέω*, *δοτέω*, *πατέω*, an pro *ιτιτέον* receptum mutata propter epalleliam vocali ut intus aucta *ἡνίπατε* et *ἐρύκακε* pro *ἐρύκυκε*, *ἡνίπιτε*." Since Lobeck's time the matter has been pretty well settled in favor of the former theory: "*ιτητέον* ist aus dem mit lat. *itare* völlig identischen **ιταω* herzuleiten" (Curtius, *Verbum*², I 342), "das sich jetzt durch das elische *ἐπ-αν-ιτα-κῶρ*, d. i. **ἐπ-α ν-ι τ η-κ ὡς* belegen lässt"; cf. Blass-Kühner, II, §292, A. 2. *ιτέον* shows the pres. stem of the verb as it appears in the dual and plural of the ind.; similarly *φατέον*. *ιστέον* seems to contain the II. aor. stem *ι*; cf. Skt. *√vid* 'to know,' with euphonic change of *δ* to *σ*. Both the pf. and II. aor. of *ἀποκείρω* exhibit the combination *καρ*: only the more frequent occurrence of the aorist favors our referring *ἀποκαρτέον* to that tense-stem. *ἀποκμητέον* would be referred to the perfect stem of *ἀποκάμνω*; but the verbal itself is a v. l. in Plat., Civ. 445b for *ἀποκνητέον*; cf. Blass-Kühner, p. 454. *παιστέον* shows a *σ* by euphony for *δ* before *τ*; cf. the Doric, or better Aeolic, *παῖσδω*. It cannot be determined whether the second *σ* in *σωστέον* be identical with that in e. g. *σέσωσμαι*, etc., or whether it is that perplexing *σ* which "hat . . . seinen Grund in der Vermischung eines Verbum *σῶω* (aus *σάσω*) mit *σῶζω*" (Curtius, Vb.² II, p. 401). Whether Aristophanes inserted the *σ* in *ἀπαρυστέον* metri gratia (Eq. 921) or not is not known. If the *α* in *δυσχεραντέον* is long by nature (the word occurs only in Plato), we refer the verbal to the stem of I. aor. *ἐδυσχέρῃνα*.

As indicated above, some verbs correspond to two verbalia, e. g. *μαχετέον* and *μαχητέον*, *οἰστέα* and *-ενεκτέον*, *ελκτέον* and *ελκυστέον*, *έτέα* and *σχετέον*. The great bulk of these verbalia are connected with *ω*-verbs, the next greater number represent *μαι*-verbs, the fewest, *μι*-verbs. The statistics are fairly accurate:

Verbalia 'derived' from <i>ω</i> -verbs,	1320
“ “ “ <i>μαι</i> -verbs,	313
“ “ “ <i>μι</i> -verbs,	198
Total,	1831

Verbals from μ i-verbs occur once in 9 cases; those from μ ai-verbs once in 6 cases; those from ω -verbs once in $1\frac{1}{2}$ cases. And yet the authors vary. Herodotus uses only ω -verbalia, with one single exception; Thucydides shows great freedom, not only in the matter of derivation, but also in using a much greater number of different verbalia, while one almost wearies of Herodotus' constant repetition of ποιητέον. Thucydides never repeats the same verbal more than twice. In this, as in other matters, Xenophon shows different preferences in different spheres of composition: he is far from being partial to ω -neuters (one case occurring in the Apology), while there is an unusually large number of μ i-transitives and intransitives in the Cynegeticus. Aristophanes admits verbalia from ω -neuter verbs much more freely than the tragedians do, especially in his later pieces. Nearly half of the verbalia showing the middle sense of their verbs (98 in toto) occur in Plato alone, and of this number 45, nearly the half, in the Republic alone. Among the orators it is not until we have passed Antiphon, Andocides and Lysias that we find any -τεο-verbal derived from a neuter verb, or any verbal showing the middle force of an ω -verb. Isaeus resuscitated Antiphon's preference for μ ai-transitives. Demosthenes avoids μ i- and μ ai-transitives, and his verbals seem to contain the middle force of the verb only twice, προαιρετέον and ανταλλακτέον. Many of the distinctions on which these statistics are based are necessarily extremely subtle, and mathematical precision is therefore impossible. No one would welcome corrections to the above, and other, statistics more gladly than the writer.—There are three possible classes of verbals, viz. simplicia, syntheta, parasyntheta. It is a fact, which at first excites our surprise, that the syntheta are practically not represented at all in the -τεο verbalia. For the only syntheton that I find at all is δυσμαχητέον, a word occurring only 5 times in all—once in Sophocles, 4 times in Plato. Nor is Sophocles' use of it—an innovation bold even for Sophocles—free from suspicion, as the verse (Antig. 106) is a bungling one, and after all there may be some especial significance in the Scholiast's περιττεύει τὸ δυσ. As between the simplicia and parasyntheta there is a decided preference for the simplicia, save in the case of Thucydides, Plato and Deinarchus. The figures are approximately 471 simplicia, 331 parasyntheta. But why this invidious discrimination against the syntheta? We know (Curtius, Erläuterungen zu meiner griechischen Schulgrammatik, §§356–7) that simple verbs

must, if compounded at all, first be compounded with prepositions: the second stage, in proceeding to the more elaborate, synthetic form, preresquires this intermediate formation, from which the more complicated syntheta are derived. Now, the verbalia in *-τεο* are so thoroughly predicative as to be under the same restrictions, in many ways, as the verbs themselves, and hence, if compounded at all, must, *δυσ-* excepted!, be compounded with prepositions. Not so with verbals in *-τος*, which have so far lost their predicative office that they, as mere adjectives, are not held down by the verb-restrictions, and can therefore enter into many fantastic formations (cf. M. I, p. 32, vs., pp. 70 ff.). But, changing the view-point, this worrying *δυσμαχητέον* might have arisen directly from its corresponding verbal in *-τος*, even long after the consciousness of the etymology of that ending had been lost.

Before leaving the subject of the outer form of the verbal, we note that the fem. to *τέος* is *τέα*, save in the dialects, where *τέη* occurs (e. g. in Herodotus, VII 168, etc.). Naturally, the feminine forms occur least frequently of all the genders—I have counted only about 30 cases all in all; but Blass-Kühner goes too far in asserting that these verbalia *generally* appear in the neuter (Gr. II, p. 5, A. 4). Such a sweeping statement can hardly be proved even after the most exhaustive and minute examination and sifting of details. Granted with Madvig (Gr., §84, b) that “von intransitiven Verben wird das Gerundiv nur im Neutrum gebildet,” yet we are perplexed at once with the case of intransitives posing as transitives by reason of having been compounded with a preposition. Deduct, moreover, all certainly fem. or masc. forms, deduct all other verbalia, which we know to be impersonal from the context, manner of expressing the agent, etc., and yet after all this there remains a bulk of ugly and desperate examples which must be conceded to be grammatical *dubia*. There is nothing, in many such cases, to *prove* whether the verbal agrees with or governs its word or construction. The verbals are incapable of receiving the comparative and superlative endings; not because, e. g., **λυτεωτατος* = *maxime dignus qui*, etc., is inconceivable, but because the verbal nature, the predicate force of the adjective, is too strong for these forms to be treated as forms in *-τος* and other adjectives.

Approaching the construction and signification of these verbalia, we must refrain from the enticing attempt to classify the

delicate shadings of meaning, ranging all the way from a mere suggestion of etiquette up to the irresistible force of the logical proof. But we do urge the acceptance of the more accurate and fitting characteristic 'obligation' in place of the traditional and harsh 'necessity.' As to the matter of construction, it is established that the verbals can be used impersonally or personally: "Mais jamais l'adjectif verbal ne peut s'employer comme simple épithète, ainsi on ne pourra dire *οἱ ἐπαινετοὶ ἄνδρες, τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἀνδρῶν*; il n'y en a pas d'exemples dans les auteurs" (Struve, *Opuscula*, p. 222). And yet Jelf, *Greek Grammar*, II, p. 261, §613, 4, makes the statement that the verbalia can be used as attributives, manufacturing, I suspect, the sentence *ἀσκητέα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή*, or *ἡ ἀσκητέα ἀρετή*. He does not cite the passage in which this latter combination of words occurs, nor does such a passage exist in the classical literature, so far as I can detect. The only apparent exception to the universal law of the *predicative* usage of the verbalia is that, as it seems, philosophic use of the verbal with the neuter of the article, the combination being used in the abstract force: *τὰ ποιητέα*, etc., a step easily taken when the copula was (easily) omitted; and we recall the demonstrative force which was always more or less capable of reviving in the article, and *τὰ ποιητέα* = *ἐκείνα, ἃ ποιητέα ἐστίν*. Cases like Hdt. I 191, VIII 40, VIII 101, IX 60 are only apparent exceptions, the dialectic relative pronoun resembling in form the (Attic) article; but the reading in IX 60 is disputed, if we may follow Blakesley. But it is an interesting, if not a suspicious, fact that this is the only passage in Hdt. in which the copula is not present with the verbal, preceded by *τὸ* = *δ*. Then our first certain case of this construction would be that Euripidean fragment, 377: *εἰδέναι τὸ δραστήον*. The fragment (24) of Chaeremon (Nauck, p. 612) does not count, as the whole passage and context is incoherent and unintelligible—even if this especial verse is properly attributed to Chaeremon after all. But once (IV 99) does Thucydides use the construction: *γινώσκειν τὸ ποιητέον*; Xenophon three times: *Cyrop.* VIII 5, 5; *Oeconom.* XII 14; *Rep. Lac.* XIII 5 (in plural, *τὰ ποιητέα*). But I have not found one case in Plato of this 'philosophic' usage, if Struve and others are right in so styling it. True, in the fragments of the philosophers we note several examples; cf. Mullach, vol. II, p. 70 (2 cases), p. 77 (5 cases), p. 78 (1 case), p. 325 (2 cases), p. 368 (1 case). But in all the corpus oratorum I find but one instance of this construction, and that is at the same time

the only passage in all the Dekas in which the agent-dative is calmly allowed to occupy the sheltered position, Dem. VI 28. Demonstrably correct, therefore, is the statement (Struve, *Opuscula*, p. 222): "De là [he speaks of this 'philosophic' construction] à l'emploi de ces adjectifs verbaux comme épithètes il n'y a qu'un pas: mais ce pas, les auteurs de la bonne grécité ne l'ont jamais fait"; then, if true at all, which I doubt, the following statement is true only for the post-classic period: "Und die (= τὰ ποιητέα, etc.) sind dann auch in die Schriftsprache als reine adjectiva epitheta übergegangen."

Already in Sanskrit the verbal in *-ya* is met with "wie im Hauptsatz so . . . auch im Relativsatz" (Delbrück, *Altind. Synt.*, p. 379). Nor do the meagre remnants of the literature between Homer and Aeschylus afford us even a tantalizing peep into the different stages through which these forms must have passed in order, from having been practically unknown in the epos, to become felt as legitimate portions of the Greek grammatical machinery. But the feeling somehow has gone abroad that these verbalia are brought in with especial frequency in the oratio obliqua. Indeed, Anton Funck makes the statement (*Rhein. Mus.* 33, 1878) that the use of these verbalia is confined to O. O. in Thucyd. and Xenophon, being always dependent on γιγνώσκω, δοκέειν, etc. That supposition can, I think, be proved erroneous, although the following statistics are of necessity extremely difficult of obtaining and hence to a degree unreliable, since after all the distinction between O. O. and O. R. is not infrequently subtle. In the main we can safely assert that while in the prose of the earlier period the verbalia are quite frequently introduced in O. O., yet, on the other hand, the dramatists seem to avoid just that usage, and it is in O. R. that the bulk of their cases occur. Neither Aeschylus nor Euripides gives a single case of the use of the vbl. in O. O., and in all the dramatic corpus I count only 7 instances of that usage, of which 6 are Sophoclean. My statistics make the ratio of O. R. examples to O. O. ones in the drama about 23+ : 1, an inequality met with in no other department of the literature. For the historians and philosophers I make the proportion to be about 3 : 1, which is about the norm for oratory. Herodotus' verbalia occur about half in O. O., half in O. R. Thucydides shows a decided preference for the O. O. usage—I count about 20 cases in O. O., 11 in O. R.; but these statistics require to be again adapted to the respective author's use of O. O. *vs.* O. R. quantitatively. Xen-

ophon varies: in the *Anabasis* and *Hellenika* the majority of the verbalia occur in the O. O. (about 33 to 10 is the ratio); but with a sudden change we note a strong preference for the O. R. setting in the *Mem.*, *Symp.*, *Oeconom.*, *R. L.*, *Hipparch.*, *De re equest.*, *Cyneget.*—statistics, about 101 O. R. to 20 O. O. cases. On the other hand, Plato's usage is much more uniform than Xenophon's, and the O. O. setting becomes least frequent in the longer pieces, esp. the *Republic*, *Timaeus*, *Laws*, while the spurious and doubtful pieces (*Epist.*, *Horoi*, *Demodocus*, *Sisypchos*, *Eryxias*) show a much higher number of O. O. examples than is according to the Platonic norm, which is about $4\frac{1}{2} : 1$ in favor of the O. R. setting. We expect the O. O. element to become less conspicuous in the orators, perhaps; but their normal proportion is about $2\frac{1}{2} : 1$, from which no serious deviation is to be noted: the statistics for Demosthenes, for example, are about 60 cases in O. R. as against 32 in O. O.

As between the affirmative and the negative setting, we find the great majority of these 1831 verbalia in affirmative sentences. My figures give the dramatic ratio as something like $5 : 1$, and for the historians and philosophers about the same proportion; while in oratory a sudden change appears, and the ratio seems to be something like $2\frac{1}{2} : 1$ —whether because of the greater fire, feeling, threat in the spoken appeal or no, I know not. Statistics for Demosthenes, 64 : 28. Before leaving the subject of the negation of the verbal, we note the unhappy discovery which has made Gross very unhappy. He finds, namely (III, pp. 10-11), that the Attics have twice negated the vbl. with *μή*, not *οὐ*, "*propter affinitatem quandam imperativi.*" The one passage is Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 512 E. But certainly no new law can be based on a passage whose meaning and reading is as uncertain as is the case with the woefully annoying and much-emended passage before us. The reading adopted by C. F. Hermann, or that of Buttmann, contains no negative at all (cf. Aken, *Grundzüge der Lehre vom Tempus und Modus*, etc., §140; also Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*², §269). More difficult is the other passage, *Republic* 535 A, where *ζητητέον μή μόνον . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ* is used in a confused sort of a way, and the words are still under the half-conscious domain of the preceding *οἷον δεῖν ἐκλεκτέας εἶναι*—itself a peculiar expression with its double statement of obligation—out of which combination of the two ideas of *saying* and *necessity* the resultant notion of command most readily develops itself. But,

on the other hand, Gross seems to have overlooked Aeschines, Epist. II, 603: οὐ γὰρ, εἰ κακῶς ἔχει τὰ πράγματα, διὰ τοῦτο μὴ δὲν, ὅπως μὴ χεῖρον ἔξει, φροντιστέον, where, possibly, the object of the verbal is attracted by reason of its proximity to the ὅπως μὴ clause.

Approaching the weightier matters of construction, we are naturally confronted with the question, Which is the older of the two possible constructions of the verbal, the impersonal or the personal? The feeling obtains among some that the impersonal is the older construction. In the present condition of the literature this cannot be proved. The only pre-Aeschylean passages in which the verbal is known to us are Theognis 689, which is a grammatical dubium, and Pindar, Ol. II 6, which is impersonal. While Aeschylus furnishes one example that is certainly impersonal, Sept. 499: πείραν εὖ φυλακτέον, he uses the verbal in a certainly personal construction twice—Sept. 600: Καρπὸς οὐ κομιστέος, and Prom. vinct. 523: συγκαλυπτέος (sc. λόγος). Sophocles gives about 18 impersonalia as against 5 personalia; Euripides 43 impersonalia as against 6 personalia. Then even these few statistics point towards a gradual development into a predominance on the part of the impersonalia, while both constructions are in full vogue in the drama. In the earlier Latinity the *gerund* is used more frequently than the gerundive, cf. A. J. P. No. 56, p. 483 ff.; but originally the *-ndo*-forms were not passive in signification, but the rather active (Dräger, Hist. Synt. II, p. 819), or, better yet, voiceless; and Stitz has proved that even subsequently the gerund, so far from being always active, showed traces of its neuter, middle and even passive force (Wochenschrift für klassische Philologie, 1890, No. 8, p. 210). But the gerundive gains ground on the gerund, as we leave Plautus and Terence and come on down, and in Sallust we count 67 gerundives as *vs.* only 39 gerunds "mit direktem Objekt" (Stitz, l. l.). We do not follow the development further (cf. Dräger, l. l., p. 822; A. J. P., Whole Nos. 34 and 36), but already a parallelism begins to show itself between the gaining preference for the Latin gerundive and the tenacious use of the Greek personal construction, which, by the way, outlived the seemingly more favored impersonal usage, for my notes give a total of about 900 cases in which the verbal is demonstrably impersonal, as against only about 90 personal gerundives, thus giving a strong numerical preference for the impersonal interpretation in the case of the vexatious dubia.

But to be more specific: the personal construction occurs twice in Aeschylus, 5 times in Sophocles, 6 times (only) in Euripides—

summa tragica = 13. Aristophanes uses the personal construction 6 times. Herodotus gives us 4 examples; Thucydides, 4; Xenophon, 15; Plato, 41; fragmenta hist. et orat., 2; total = 66. Of the orators, Antiphon furnishes 2 examples; Isocrates, 3; Dem., 7; total = 12. Then the total of all cases in which the grammatical context proves the verbal to be indisputably personal we infer to be 97, if the statistics are accurate. Thus Plato uses the personal construction most frequently of the prose-writers, 41 cases in 2442 T. pages, i. e. about 1 : 60; Herodotus least frequently, 4 cases in 799 T. pages, i. e. about 1 : 200. Only 3 of the Dekas use it at all, hence it finds its sphere not in Oratory, nor in Herodotus, the non-Attic, nor in Thucydides, the Attic historian. Sophocles' slightly higher ratio of usage may not be especially significant, nor the fact that he always places the personal verbal at the end of the line. Its real sphere seems to be the colloquial one, e. g. Plato's Dialogues, Xenophon, when not too strict and historical; there are only 2 instances of it in the Anab., and one of these is doubtful; there is no case in the Hellenika; the ratio gets very high in the Mem. (1 : 35½ pages), quite low in Plato's Laws (1 : 140 pages), at its highest (in Plato) in the Republic (!), 1 : 14. Furthermore, of Demosthenes' 7 cases three occur in one speech (24), and of those three, two are in one and the same clause, the one a negative antithesis of the other. Isocrates wandered off into the only case of the verbal being used in the gen. absolute in the classic period; his other two verbalia occur in the same paragraph of the Παναθηναϊκός.

Then these verbalia are all passives, and derived from verbs which are, or should be, transitives, however subtle the distinction between Homer's βαίνω διὰ + acc. and διαβαίνω + acc. By the way, Krüger (Sprachlehre, §56, 18, a. 1) uses the example βασιλευτέα ἡ πόλις—the gerund βασιλευτέα does not occur in classic Greek! But what is the great distinction in signification between the personal and impersonal constructions? We at once meet the 'rule' thus formulated by some grammarians: When the personal construction is used, the emphasis falls on the subject of the act; when the impersonal, on the act itself. Not only grammars, but even so neat a worker as Kopetsch (p. 28) hands down this tradition: "videntur apud Platonem verbo εἶναι tantum iuncta esse, ita quidem, ut, si in subiecto, quod vocant, vis est sita, hoc sequantur et genere et numero, contra si in actione, in neutro genere, et singularis quidem fere semper." But that law does not really

obtain. Already Schülze (p. 10) uses the following words: "sed hanc legem in oratores Atticos non valere Karlowa (Bemerkungen zum Sprachgebrauch des Demosthenes, etc., pp. 13-14) luculenter ostendit." Before seeing Karlowa's Programm I had disproved the validity of this 'law' relatively to other authors; indeed, it is mechanical as well as false; moreover, the real stress rests often on neither verb nor subject, but on other words in the sentence, e. g. inner accus., adverb, agent-expression, etc. Cases in which that 'rule' cannot obtain are, e. g. Dem. 24, 78; 54, 44; 21, 142; 22, 62; Aeschines 1, 138; Isocrates 12, 233. In Herodotus, IX 58 the two constructions occur side by side, with logical subjects identical, and there is no more emphasis on the subject in the one clause than in the other. A clue to the true interpretation might be suspected to lie in the following circumstance. The first clause is a negative, ἐκείνοισι τὰυτα ποιεῖσι οὐκ ἐπιτρεπέα ἐστί: the temporarily entertained conception is immediately rejected by the negative, hence the undesirability of the personal construction, which tends to emphasize duration, because characteristic, adjectival. Just that fact makes the personal construction desirable in the second clause, an affirmative one: ἀλλὰ διωκτέοι εἰσίν. Again that mechanical distinction fails in Hdt. III 127, where the *manner* of Orestes' death is 'emphasized'; fails in Xen., Mem. III 10, 8; in Xen., Cyropaed. II, II 23; ib. VII, V 7; Oecon. XIX 9; Symp. VIII 20; Plato, Gorgias 508 *a*; the construction got twisted in Phaedo 107 B, the intervening conditional causing the grammatical consecutio to shift from the impersonal to the personal usage. The 'law' fails in Plato, Rep. 403 C; ib. 561 C; Epist. 342 A; Aeschylus, Prom. 523; Soph., O. C. 883; Ajax 679; Eur., Orest. 484; Aristoph., Ach. 221; Ran. 633—these are some of the more conspicuous of the cases, selected at random. My own conception of the nature of the personal construction was just about that which Karlowa has formulated in the following words: "Da nun bei der unpersönlichen Konstruktion das Verbaladjektiv als Verbum, bei der persönlichen als Adjektivum behandelt wird, so lässt sich schliessen, dass die persönliche Konstruktion nur da angewandt wird, *wo eine Eigenschaft beigelegt wird.*" Then if we wish to express an abiding quality, a characteristic, the gerundive is the construction to use, in the first instance, and the Schol. to Aeschylus, Sept. 600, paraphrases οὐ κομιστέος by οὐκ ἄξιος κομίζεσθαι. But the full and wide distinction between personal and impersonal construction—

their exact spheres—we will attempt to formulate more accurately below. Karlowa's statement needs both restriction and enlargement, to say nothing of that other fact, viz. that questions of style, attractions, 'Wortlaut,' etc., not infrequently cause sudden and seemingly unnecessary changes from the one construction to the other; e. g. Xen., Mem. III, X 8; Plato, Protag. 356 C; Rep. 535 A, 373 B.

Before leaving the subject of the personal construction, we note an interesting fact connected with the agent-expression of these personalia. While the agent is more commonly not expressed at all with the gerundives, yet when expressed it is always in the dative, never the accusative. Out of the sum-total of 97 gerundives, only 27 (with a possible addition of 2 more doubtful cases in Thucydides) are associated with their agent-cases—always datives. And why "always datives"? Not because of the following explanation (I cite from Gross, III, p. 10): "Quod gerundiva nunquam cum accusativo personae coniuncta videmus, id non casui tribuendum sed eam ob causam certissimam factum arbitror, quod gerundiva, quum in adiectivarum familiam se contulissent, simul etiam naturam illam verbis *δεῖν* et *χρῆναι* similem exuerunt." Others many have said the like, only from a different point of view. Then, in cases where reasons and exigencies of style necessitate a sudden shift from the impersonal to the personal construction, immediately and always we must see a corresponding difference in the organic sense of the two verbalia—connected, as they sometimes are, with the same subject? This semasiological gymnastic feat is certainly *not* necessary. The proper state of the case, as I think it, will be given below. Suffice it to say here that the verb-force of the gerundive is not strong enough to command an agent-accusative. Of that anon.

Impersonalia.—As we saw above, the facts do not warrant us in accepting the theory of some, that the impersonal construction is the older of the two—the 'original' one ("Originairement, cet adjectif verbal, pris impersonnellement, eut la signification active," etc., Struve, l. l.). We saw that the impersonal construction was through the whole of the classical period much the more frequently used; but for all that the personal usage appeared with a tenacious regularity all through the classical time, and in fact has actually outlived the more favored impersonal construction,

and I have the statement of a scholarly gentleman in Greece, a Ph. D. of the University of Athens, to the effect that the impersonal construction is, in Modern Greek, dead, while the personal use lives yet, and the verbal is actually allowed to stand in the sheltered position.

The gerund (impersonally used verbal) can be used either *absolutely*, i. e. not 'governing' any case, or in a transitive sense, controlling the construction of a word or words in the sentence. In the first construction we have verbs which are incapable of 'governing' case, or else those whose possible cases are omitted. More interesting are the other cases, those in which the verbal 'governs' its case, generally a genitive. According to my statistics the classic literature from Homer to Aristotle furnishes 1076 cases in which the verbalia are used impersonally; of this number 34 are in the plural, the remaining 1042 in the singular, none in the dual. Now, of these 1076, 645 'govern' cases directly, and the study of those passages is interesting indeed. We note a gradual development out of the earlier, free usage, into the later fixity. That development does not so much affect the use of the genitive as versus the dative case, for there shows itself little or no preference in that matter. I count 77 cases of the genitive, 67 of the dative. More interesting is the matter of the use of the accusative as versus the absolute, neuter use of the verbal. The 'governed' accus. seems to be expressed 501 times, while the verbal appears without accusative 321 times, though we include in this latter list many cases in which the accusative is actually mentioned in the context, but for various reasons of style, etc., is not repeated in direct connection with the verbal—I roughly count about 60 such passages. Now, in the earlier writers the preference is to use the verbal absolutely, rather than with its expressed accusative-object. So in the drama, so in history up to Xenophon; in this period I count 35 cases of the expressed accusative-object as against 68 cases of the verbal used absolutely. Sophocles admits the accusative only twice, though using the verbal absolutely 12 times—freer in the admission of the oblique case are Euripides and Aristophanes;—we count 18 and 10 accusatives respectively, as against 19 and 23 cases of the absolute verbal. Suddenly the accusative construction becomes popular—with Xenophon—and remains so: Xenophon expresses the accusative 63 times, using the verbal absolutely 29 times; Plato, 302 accusatives, 175 absolute; Philosphorum fragmenta,

acc. 32, abs. 17; Isocrates, acc. 28, abs. 9; Demosthenes, acc. 25, abs. 13. The verb-power of the verbal has grown, and hence the accusative-object is expressed more freely. Then the uncertainty and fluctuation of the earlier period betrays an experimenting spirit, would seem to indicate that the gerund construction was not at that time old enough to have attained its ultimate fixity; that it originated, possibly, between Homer and Pindar, and perchance nearer to Pindar than to Homer. Of the verbals referred to above as used absolutely, not a few are, as a matter of fact, followed by prepositions with their cases. Of those prepositions *περί* is the favorite, occurring 27 times; *ἐπί* comes next, 21 times; then *εἰς*, 19 times; *πρός*, 14 times; *ἀπό*, 10 times; and *ὑπέρ*, 8 times; the rest (*παρά*, *διά*, *πρό*, etc.) occurring from 1 to 3 times each.

As stated above, the genitive occurs somewhat more frequently than the dative, in direct dependence on the gerund. I count about 75 such instances. The most frequently recurring verbal is *ἐπιμελητέον*, introduced by Xenophon, occurring chiefly in Xen. and the philosophers, and appearing with its gen. about 12 times in all; *μελητέον* and *ἀμελητέον* occur each once. 8 times the gen. depends on *ἀφεκτέον*, 4 times on *ἐκτέον* and its other compounds; but often the substitution of a *τι* or the like, on which after all the gen. might depend, lies dangerously near. The verbs of hearing—*ἀκουστέον* 6 times, *ἀκροατέον* once—also occur; *ἀπτέον* has its gen. 5 times; *ἀποστατέον*, 4 times; *ἀρκτέον* and *ἀντιληπτέον* each 3 times; *ἡσσητέα*, *μεταδοτέον*, *κατηγορητέον*, *ἀπαλλακτέον*, *κοινωνητέον* each twice, while the list closes with the following *semel inventa*: *ἀπαρυστέον*, *ὑφελκτέον*, *προοπτέον*, *ἡγητέον*, *καταψηφιστέον*, *ἀποτμητέον*, *γευστέον*, *ἀποδεκτέον*, *διανοητέον* (very doubtful), *ἀπολαυστέον*, *ὀλιγωρητέον*, *ὑπεροπτέον*, *ἀποπειρατέον*, *φειστέον*, *πανυστέον*, *ληκτέον*. Then all of these are what we might call natural, as distinguished from artificial genitives, if our constructions are in each case correct.

I count about 66 cases of the gerund 'governing' the *dative*. Again, Xenophon seems to have introduced the most commonly recurring of these verbals—*χρηστέον*, occurring 17 times; Euripides already uses the next most frequently recurring one, *πειστέον*, 12 cases, while all others are used much less frequently; e. g. 4 cases of *πιστευτέον*; 3 each of *δουλευτέον*, *ἐπιστατητέον*, *προσεκτέον*; 2 each of *βοηθητέον*, *παρχωρητέον*, *ἐπιθετέον*, *χαριστέον*, *ἀθυμητέον*, *ὁμονοητέον*. Again the list closes with the *semel inventa* *ἀμυντέα*, *δυσμαχητέον*, *ἐπιτρεπτέα*, *συρσετέον*, *ἀποκριτέον*, *προσχηρηστέον*, *συνχωρητέα*, *θαρη-*

τέον, ἀκολουθητέον, συμβουλευτέον, ἐπακολουθητέον, στερκτέον. Thucydides is no lover of these oblique-case constructions, using the gen. only 3 times, the dat. never; nor does Euripides use the gen. but once, the dat. 3 times with his 44 gerunds. But in the majority, at least, of those cases the gerund construction was a necessity. The voluntary and conspicuous choice and preference for the gerund construction appears first in the following passages, in which the personal construction was possible, the accusative of the active (gerund) becoming the nom. of the passive (gerundive).

But before we go over to the more minute examination of the impersonalia which are associated with the accusative alone, those verbalia will be noticed which display a twofold 'governing' capacity, being associated with the gen. or dat. in addition to the accus. There are only about a dozen such verbals, but it would defy the skill of the most astute, sometimes, to tell whether or no a given dative or genitive depends on the verb-force of the verbal, and not on some subtle noun or pronoun that can easily be supplied, and hence is not expressed in the context; in other words, when a dative "depends on the verb," and when it is the dative of the complex. It may be well to look at a few of these passages. The verbal is always in the sg. (-τέον) when associated with the accusative, though both sg. and pl. occur (-τέον and -τέα), when that verbal is accompanied by its other case. Twice the verbal in -τέα is associated with the dative, three times with the genitive. ἐπιτρεπτέον occurs twice (Hdt. IX 58; Plat., Symp. 213 E) with the dative, 4 times with the accusative (Pl., Protag. 313 B; Anterastai 138 E; Laws 876 A, ib. 876 D). With the dat. it means 'to allow,' and once (Hdt. IX 58) is accompanied by a participle. Such rudimentary construction-dependencies begin to appear not infrequently in these passages. With the direct object the sense of the vbl. is 'to entrust,' and it is always accompanied by its remoter dat., with the sole exception of Plat., Laws 876 D, since the second ἐπιτρεπτέον in Laws 876 A does not count. ἐπιθετέον occurs but once governing an accus. (Plato, Gorg. 507 D), and there it shows the middle force, "auf sich nehmen"; with the dative it occurs twice (Pl., Symp. 217 C; Plat., Soph. 231 C), but these datives are really indirect objects: "eum adoriamur oportet." ἀποκριτέον with the accus. (Pl., Rep. 413 D; ib. 414 A) means 'to reject,' 'discard.' Only once (Plat., Hipp. mai. 288 D) does it seem to be associated with a dative, and that dative is an ind. object. συγχωρητέον occurs once (Pl.,

Soph. 249 B) with an accusative; but there we have really a sentence-dependency: τὸ κινούμενον δὴ καὶ κίνησιν συγχωρητέον ὡς ὄντα. Its dat. occurs but once, Pl., Leg. 895 A, where L. and S. are unhappy in giving it the sense of 'to concede'; it means 'to accede, assent to.' προσεκτέον has its accus. τὸν νοῦν expressed in 3 passages—Pl., Menon 96 D; Isoc., Ep. 2, 17; Isoc., Ep. 7, 7;—when the acc. is omitted we have the three datives—Pl., Demod. 384 E Aeschines, I 119; Dinarch. I 112, in which latter passage, by the way, the remarkable *consecutio verborum* occurs: οὐ προσεκτέον ὑμῖν ἐστι τοῖς τούτων λόγοις εἰδόμενος, etc. ἀκουστέον always has the gen., except in the one passage Pl., Rep. 386 A, where the acc. occurs in the artificial circumlocution τὰ περὶ θεοῦ. In 3 of the remaining 6 cases it means 'to obey' (Soph., El. 340; Eur., Iph. Aul. 1010; Herod. III 61); in the other 3, 'to hear' (Ar., Ran. 1180; Xen., Symp. III 9; Philos. fragt., vol. I, p. 448). But Schöhl suspects the whole context of Soph., El. 340 of being spurious. ἐκτέον governs the accus. in 5 cases (Xen., Mem. III 11, 2; Pl., Anterastai 138 E; Rep. 468 A, ibid. 535 B; Dem. LVIII 60) as against one passage (Xen., Hell. VI 1, 13) in which it shows the middle force of the verb. Twice the accusative occurs after ἀποδεκτέον (Xen., Oecon. VII 36; Pl., Leg. 668 A). In the remaining two passages in which it seems to directly govern a case (Pl., Phaedrus 272 B; Rep. 379 C) we see the subtle development of the sentence-dependencies. In the latter passage the verbal is associated with the name of a person, and it in turn is accompanied by a participle: ἀποδεκτέον . . . Ὁμήρου . . . ἀμαρτάνοντος καὶ λέγοντος, etc. We look upon this as a not yet fully developed sentence-dependency. But in the Theaetet. 160 C the genitive, ἄλλου λέγοντος, does not depend on the verbal, but is an absolute; hence it is unnecessary (with L. and S.) to ache over the rarity of the construction of ἀποδεκτέον + gen. of thing + part., as it *appears* to occur in the Phaedrus 272 B, where the participle, λεγομένης, is *attributive*. Both the grammatical difficulties attending this construction, as also the uncertainty of the reading in Pl., Laws 646 D, make it desirable not to include διανοητέον amongst those verbalia which control the double construction; cf. Stallbaum ad loc.

Once πανστέον shows the middle force in Demosthenes (X 76), being followed by the gen. pl.; it is accompanied by the accusative in the remaining three cases: Plat., Gorg. 523 D; Plat., Rep. 391 E; Isoc. XV 175. But, after all, it is often a matter of

subjective decision—or a matter of taste?—whether we interpret the accompanying participle as attributive or predicative, and therefore practically equivalent to a sentence-dependency. At any rate, the causal interpretation of the participle is not to be rejected too hastily.

Proceeding to the verbalia which are associated with the accusative alone, we take up *first* those instances in which the verbal appears associated with a simple direct accusative; *secondly*, those which show the double accusative; *thirdly*, the verbal followed by its rudimentary sentence-dependencies developed out of the double accusative.

I. Transitive verbal followed by the simple, direct accusative-object.—The first example of this construction is Pindar, Ol. II 6: *Θήρωνα . . . γεγωνητέον*. The next appearance of the construction is the one example in Aeschylus, Sept. 499. After Sophocles, who gives us two instances of it, the construction is quite common. I seem to have counted 369 examples of this simple construction in our period, excluding, so far as that can be certainly done, all inner accusatives, double accusatives, etc. The object of the verbal in the example in Pindar was a person; in Aeschylus, a thing; of Sophocles' two, one was a person, one a thing. After this the preference for thing-objects develops—not very strong at first, as the ratio for the tragedians is about 1 : 2. But Aristophanes shows a decided preference for thing-objects, while Xen. reverts to the (approximate) tragic norm, but at times so far overruns it as to give a total of 20 person- to 25 thing-accusatives. But with Plato the decided preference for thing-accusatives returns, and even the increase in person-accusatives in the Republic—chiefly in the Third Book—barely serves to raise the general proportion above the tragic norm. The use in the *Fragmenta philosophorum* corresponds about to that of Plato, while the orators show something of Xenophon's liking for person-accusatives, the ratio rising to something like 1 : 3. As stated above, the total number of examples of this construction we give to be 369; of these 290 are thing-accusatives, 79 persons. The person, as it were, resists the (weaker) verb-force of the verbal; not so the lifeless thing, over which the verbal easily exerts its power. The verbal itself, thus used, is always in the sg., save in Thucyd. I 86, 3 (*παραδοτέα*), Ar., Plut. 1085 (*συνεκποτέα*), and Plato, Rep. 317 B (*ἀποβλητέα*). Of course, all these verbalia are derived from transitive verbs; e. g. *φυλακτέον*, *ἀνοικτέον*, *κακιστέον*, *νικητέον*, *τολμητέον*, *ἐκδοτέον*, etc.

But already in Eur., Suppl. 291 the acc. of the inner object begins to dispute the field with our 'direct object,' and one may well hesitate before 'parsing' the acc. in στενακτέον τὰ τούτων, and yet not be a heretic; nor is it news to any one that countless passages occur whose accusatives fall on the border-line between what we call 'direct object' and acc. of inner object. Delbrück defines the object as the "Gegenstand der von der Handlung des Verbums unmittelbar betroffen wird," and it is a deliverance to be able to avoid the expression 'transitive verb.' He continues: "Der Akkusativ des Resultats ist . . . wenn man seine Entstehung in betracht zieht, von dem Akk. des Inhalts nicht zu trennen. Der fertige Akkusativ des Resultats aber steht dem des Objekts am nächsten. Denn schwerlich empfindet der Sprechende einen Unterschied zwischen 'ein Haus bauen (Resultat), und 'ein Haus einreissen' (Objekt)." The inner accusative is no scarcity after these impersonal verbalia: examples like Xen., Anab. II, II 12 (πορευτέον . . . σταθμούς); Pl., Gorg. 500 D (βιωτέον . . . ὁπότερον, sc. βίον); Pl., Rep. 467 B (κινδυνευτέον . . . τι); Pl., Rep. 504 D (περιτετέον . . . μακροτέραν); Ar., Equit. 72 (τρεπτέον . . . ὁδόν); and Soph., Phil. 994 (πειστέον . . . τάδε) explain themselves. Genuine cognate accusatives are, e. g., μηχανητέον . . . μηχανήν (Pl., Legg. 798 E) and προαγωνιστέον . . . προαγώνας (Pl., Laws 796 D). The simple accusative of the result of the object effected by the action of the verb is not so common here as are the inner object and the cognate accusative. Instances of the former are, e. g., Ar., Eq. 72; Xen., Anab. II, II 12; Plat., Gorg. 500 D; Pl., Soph. 257 A; Rep. 467 B, *ibid.* 504 D; Kritias 108 D; Soph., Phil. 994. Instances of the latter construction are Pl., Legg. 798 E, 796 D, etc. But the sphere widens as we approach those cases in which the object of the verbal is the proleptic subject of the dependent clause; such cases are, e. g., Xen., Mem. II, VI 8; Pl., Soph. 260 E, *ib.* 230 D; Pl., Politicus 260 C, *ib.* 306 A; Alc. II 140 D; Rep. 421 E (?), *ib.* 555 B, *ib.* 502 D; Philebus 33 C, *ib.* 23 A; Eur., Hel. 85; Xen., Mem. II, VI 8. In these cases there is only a grammatical difference between a dubium and a certainly impersonal gerund. Less interesting are the cases in which the verbal's direct object or object affected is followed by a prepositional phrase; e. g. Xen., Mem. IV, II 15; Cyrop. I 6, 31; Frag. histor. II, p. 167 (?); Pl., Rep. 540 A, *ib.* 537 C; Frag. phil. I, p. 556; Dem. XXIX 36, *ib.* LVIII 60; Eur., Elect. 491, etc.

II. Verbal followed by the *double accusative*.—Delbrück distinguishes three classes of double accusatives: 1°. Cases in which the one accusative is a predicate; 2°. The one accus. stands nearer to the verb than the other does; 3°. The verb's action affects α) a person and a thing, or β) a whole in one of its parts. To begin at the end, I have only one case of 3 β), viz. Plato, Timaeus 67 E: αὐτὰ προσρητέον, τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δ' ἐναντίον, etc., and this might be classed under 1°. Scarcely more popular was 3 α), of which my lists show only two examples: Xen., Hell. VI 3, 7: διδάκτεον ἀλλήλους τὰ αἷτια κ. τ. λ.; Plato, Rep. 451 E: ταῦτα καὶ διδάκτεον αὐτάς. Similarly of construction 2° I count only five cases, nor are all of those free from some sort of suspicion: the loci are Xen., Cyrop. VII, I 11; Mem. I, VII 2; de re eq. X 11; Plat., Epinom. 983 E (?), and Euthydemus 273 C. Then the great bulk of our examples of the double accusative fall under the first head. We might roughly divide these (forty) cases into α) those which *do not*, β) those which *do* imply the idea of *saying, thinking*, etc. But it is often a treacherous line of demarkation between rudimentary O. O. and full-fledged O. O. Plato abounds in cases of *θετέον*, e. g. Laws 867 A, 654 B; Soph. 235 A, etc., and we cannot possibly tell just when a worrison *εἶναι* lies concealed just below the surface. The second class is introduced by, if not fully represented in such verbals as *κλητέον*, *ἡγητέον*, *λεκτέον*, *φατέον*, *προσρητέον*, *ξυγχωρητέον*, *ἐπονομαστέον*, *νομοθετητέον*, etc. Then, if such cases are certainly impersonalia, does it not follow that the O. O. dependencies always make their verbalia impersonal? As examples of the fairly clear double acc. we might cite the following, chosen at random from the large number on my lists: Xen., Mem. IV, X 8; Plat., Cratyl. 393 C; Laws 867 A; Rep. 545 B; Phileb. 15 B, 56 D; Timaeus 79 D, etc.; Frg. phil. I, p. 492; II, p. 55; Dem. XXXIX 35, XXIII 74. But just as the construction of the double accus. can be abbreviated or mutilated by omissions, etc., so there is sometimes an extension of the mode of expression, and we suspect beginnings of sentence-dependencies. *θετέον αὐτὸν στρατηγόν* does not differ materially from *θετέον αὐτὸν τέχνην ἔχοντα* (Pl., Soph. 221 D). Other superadded participles appear in Pl., Soph. 255 D, 249 B (part.+ὥς); Politicus 293 E; Philebus 37 E; Isoc. XII 96. More difficult of exact analysis is the participle in Pl., Gorg. 523 D: *πανστέον . . . προειδόμενος αὐτοὺς τὸν θάνατον*. Bolder yet are the infinitives; e. g. Isoc. IX 7: *τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἐθιστέον ἀκούειν*—is this acc. of inner obj.? So *ὥς*+indic. is admitted in

Pl., Soph. 230 D; $\omega\varsigma$ +inf., Dem. XX 154: $\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ νόμους σπουδαστέον $\omega\varsigma$ κάλλιστ' ἔχειν, where we have prolepsis of the subject of dependent clause. Difficult is Pl., Philebus 61 A; if $\mu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu$ is acc. of measure in Xen., Apol. 26, is not $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$ πολλοῦ a (logical) accus. in sentences like Plat., Rep. 389 B: ἀλήθειάν γε $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$ πολλοῦ ποιητέον? Then comes μέγα φρονητέον+ἐπί+dat.; cf. Xen., Hell. II 4, 40; II 4, 41. ἀποδεκτέον is followed by the acc. sg.+gen. sg.+part. in Pl., Rep. 379 C; αἰτιατέον is followed by acc. sg.+gen. of inf. in Pl., Timaeus 57 C. So προσλογιστέα is followed by acc.+dat. (both of things) in Hdt. VII 185; πειστέον+dat.+acc. pl., Pl., Rep. 365 E; κοινωνητέον+gen.+dat., Pl., Rep. 403 B; αἰτιατέον+acc. pers.+gen. rei, Pl., Timaeus 87 B; προτιμητέον+acc.+gen., Pl., Laws 726; ἐατέον+acc.+gen., Pl., Laws 969 C; αἰτιατέον+acc.+gen., Dem. X 76; προαιρετέον+acc.+gen., Dem. VI 51 Which is agent in Isoc. IX 7, δουλευτέον+acc.+dat.? Ἀπολυτέον is followed by acc.+gen. in Frgt. Oratorum, p. 132. In Xen., Cyropaed. I 6, 9, ἀγωνιστέον is followed by $\alpha\grave{\iota}$ +πρός+acc.; the prepositional phrase is equal to a second acc. Αἰτιατέον+acc.+gen. occurs in Pl., Rep. 379 C. Ast and L. & S. differ in construing ἀπεικαστέον+acc.+dat. in Pl., Phaedrus 270 E. προσοιστέον is followed by acc.+dat. in Pl., Phaedrus 272 A.

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